What's the vulnerability?
fast-uri normalize() decoded percent-encoded authority delimiters inside the host component and then re-emitted them as raw delimiters during serialization. A host that combined an allowed domain, an encoded at-sign, and a different domain was re-emitted with the at-sign as a raw userinfo separator, changing the URI's authority to the second domain. Applications that normalize untrusted URLs before host allowlist checks, redirect validation, or outbound request routing can be steered to a different authority than the input appeared to specify. Versions <= 3.1.1 are affected. Update to 3.1.2 or later.
Business impact & how R4IM helps
This advisory is on our active-exploitation watchlist. Attackers are using it for initial access, privilege escalation or lateral movement in real-world intrusions. R4IM's offensive security and SOC teams already have detections, exploit replicas and remediation playbooks for this issue.
Targeted vulnerability assessment to confirm which of your assets are actually exploitable — not just theoretically affected.
Our pentesters chain this CVE into realistic attack paths so you see business impact, not just a scan finding.
If the affected product is internet-facing, our AppSec team will harden it against this and related OWASP-class issues.
Continuous monitoring with custom detections for this CVE deployed across your endpoints, identity and cloud.
Recommended remediation
- Inventory all assets running the affected vendor and product, including shadow IT and third-party hosted instances.
- Apply the vendor patch or mitigation referenced in the advisories below. Where no patch exists, isolate the asset or restrict network exposure.
- Hunt for indicators of prior compromise — exploitation of this class of bug often predates public disclosure.
- Deploy detections for the exploit primitives (network signature, EDR rule, WAF rule) and re-test after remediation.
Need help executing these steps? Our team typically completes validation and remediation within a single patch cycle. Request remediation support →
Vendor & research references
- https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html · ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb
- https://github.com/fastify/fast-uri/security/advisories/GHSA-v39h-62p7-jpjc · ce714d77-add3-4f53-aff5-83d477b104bb
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25271 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25273 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26225 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26234 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28571 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29197 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29795 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29796 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29800 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:29834 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30076 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:33683 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34160 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34342 · 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c
