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- The s2Member plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, <= 260927 via…Critical
- Bucket Squatting in Google Cloud Run MCP versions prior to 1.11.0 on Google Cloud Platform allows an attacker to intercept an…Tracked
- Some externally supplied values stored by the device may be rendered in the web interface without sufficient output encoding.Medium
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The s2Member plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, <= 260927 via…
The s2Member plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, <= 260927 via the 'item_name' parameter parameter. This is due to insufficient sanitization in strip_php_tags_deep(), which only strips literal '<?' sequences, combined with a post-interpolation placeholder cleanup that reassembles a valid '<?php' opener after the attacker-controlled value has already been embedded in the email template. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to execute code on the server.
Bucket Squatting in Google Cloud Run MCP versions prior to 1.11.0 on Google Cloud Platform allows an attacker to intercept an…
Bucket Squatting in Google Cloud Run MCP versions prior to 1.11.0 on Google Cloud Platform allows an attacker to intercept and access proprietary source code, execute arbitrary code and exfiltrate data. Users must upgrade to Cloud Run MCP version 1.11.0 or later.
Some externally supplied values stored by the device may be rendered in the web interface without sufficient output encoding.
Some externally supplied values stored by the device may be rendered in the web interface without sufficient output encoding. An attacker who can influence one of these values could cause script execution in the browser of a user who views an affected page. Exploitation requires an attacker to influence a stored value and a user to view a page that renders it.
The jose library accepts ECDSA (ES256, ES256K, ES384, and ES512) JWS signatures of a non-canonical length.
The jose library accepts ECDSA (ES256, ES256K, ES384, and ES512) JWS signatures of a non-canonical length. When verifying an ECDSA signature, jose_jwk_kty_ec:verify/4 in src/jwk/jose_jwk_kty_ec.erl splits the raw signature in half by its actual byte length (split_binary(Signature, byte_size(Signature) div 2)) instead of enforcing the fixed length required by RFC 7518 §3.4, and then decodes each half with crypto:bytes_to_integer/1, which ignores leading zero bytes. As a result, an attacker who holds one valid token can prepend leading zero bytes to each of the R and S halves to produce longer signatures that still split evenly and decode to the same (r, s) pair, so many distinct signature byte strings all verify against the same key (signature malleability). This does not allow forging new payloads or impersonating a signer, because the underlying (r, s) values are unchanged. It does defeat any security control that assumes a valid token or its signature is unique, such as token-revocation-by-hash, replay or idempotency caches, and deduplication logic. This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.
Observable Timing Discrepancy vulnerability in potatosalad jose allows recovery of a long-term X25519 private key through a t…
Observable Timing Discrepancy vulnerability in potatosalad jose allows recovery of a long-term X25519 private key through a timing side channel in the pure-Erlang Curve25519 fallback. The pure-Erlang X25519 implementation performs scalar multiplication over the secret private key using a recursive Montgomery ladder (jose_jwa_x25519:curve25519/2) whose clauses branch on individual bits of the clamped private scalar, and whose per-step operations (jose_jwa_x25519:montgomery_add/3 and jose_jwa_x25519:montgomery_double/1) and field inversion are built from value-dependent Erlang bignum arithmetic (multiplication, remainder, and modular exponentiation). Although the ladder is operation-count balanced and fixed at 254 steps, the concrete integer values processed at each step, and therefore the running time, depend on the secret scalar. The execution time of the public entry points jose_jwa_x25519:scalarmult/2, jose_jwa_x25519:x25519/2, jose_jwa_x25519:x25519_base/1, and jose_jwa_x25519:sk_to_pk/1 is thus a function of the private key. This path is reachable from the public API, most notably when a service decrypts attacker-supplied ECDH-ES (JWE) messages with a long-term X25519 key (for example through JOSE.JWK.box_decrypt_ecdh_es/2, which reaches jose_jwa_curve25519:x25519_shared_secret/2 and the ladder). An attacker who can submit ciphertexts and measure decryption timing can, in principle, recover the private key bit by bit, defeating the resistance X25519 was designed to provide. Recovery of the key compromises the confidentiality and authenticity of all data protected by it. This issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.
Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-enc…
Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack. When jose exports a password-encrypted private key with jose_jwk:to_der/2 (JOSE.JWK.to_der/2), the jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3 function in src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl serializes the key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller. Both values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key. This issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.
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