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HighCVE-2026-97035
Vulnerability advisory

When using Clang or GCC, building a malicious package that uses cgo could cause unexpected code execution at build time or wr…

When using Clang or GCC, building a malicious package that uses cgo could cause unexpected code execution at build time or write files to arbitrary directories via "-gen-*" or "-gnat*" flags in "#cgo" directives. The "-g*" wildcard in the compiler and linker flag allowlists previously matched Clang's two-argument "-gen-cdb-fragment-path <dir>" flag and GCC's two-argument "-gnatO <file>" flag, permitting compilation database fragments and sidecar output files to be written to arbitrary directories and desynchronizing flag argument parsing between the go command and the compiler driver so that subsequent arguments could be passed as unvalidated positional inputs to the linker. "-gen-*" and "-gnat*" flags are now disallowed in "#cgo" compiler and linker flags.

Updated Nov 16Remediation
TrackedCVE-2026-96414
Vulnerability advisory

In affected versions of Octopus Server, insufficient integrity protection of authentication cookies, combined with incorrect…

In affected versions of Octopus Server, insufficient integrity protection of authentication cookies, combined with incorrect validation of permissions assigned to a user that allowed them to view users or audit events, could result in the user escalating their privileges to those of an Administrator.

Updated Nov 16Remediation
MediumCVE-2026-93673
Vulnerability advisory

The Zephyr WebSocket client validates the server's handshake response in on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websoc…

The Zephyr WebSocket client validates the server's handshake response in on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c. The comparison was performed as strncmp(at, str, length), where length is the length of the value the server sent rather than the length of the expected value, so the check only asked whether the received value was a prefix of the expected base64(SHA-1(key || GUID)). A server that returned a handful of correct characters passed, and a response carrying an empty Sec-WebSocket-Accept: header caused strncmp() to be called with a count of zero, which returns 0 and set ctx->sec_accept_ok with no comparison performed at all. The header-value callback also cleared ctx->sec_accept_present after the first chunk, so a value split across receive-buffer boundaries was only ever examined in part. ctx->sec_accept_ok is the sole WebSocket-specific gate in websocket_connect(); the client does not check the HTTP status code or the Upgrade:/Connection: headers. Any HTTP response containing an empty or prefix-matching Sec-WebSocket-Accept header therefore completed the handshake, after which the socket is finalized as a WebSocket and all further peer bytes are parsed as frames. The affected path is driven directly by remote input through subsys/net/lib/http/http_parser.c, and is reached by every user of websocket_connect(), including MQTT over WebSocket (subsys/net/lib/mqtt/mqtt_transport_websocket.c) and subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c. The Sec-WebSocket-Accept exchange is not a secret-based authentication -- an endpoint or on-path attacker that sees the request can compute the expected value -- so the impact is bounded to parties that never observed the handshake request: a caching or transparent intermediary replaying a canned response, an off-path attacker injecting a spoofed response, or a non-WebSocket endpoint the client was induced to talk to. For those, the per-connection binding that RFC 6455 requires the client to enforce provided no protection at all, letting a single crafted response convince the device it holds a live WebSocket session and causing it to send application data to, and accept frames from, an unverified peer. There is no memory-safety consequence. The fix compares each delivered chunk against the expected value at the position reached so far, refuses a chunk that would overrun it, and accepts only once every byte of the expected value -- and no more -- has been matched; on_header_field() now also clears the flag for any other header so a partial value cannot be continued across an intervening header.

Updated Nov 16Remediation
MediumCVE-2026-93672
Vulnerability advisory

bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferenc…

bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer. The lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first. The dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert. The fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.

Updated Nov 16Remediation
LowCVE-2026-93671
Vulnerability advisory

The websocket client's HTTP header callback on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c receives the Sec-WebSoc…

The websocket client's HTTP header callback on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c receives the Sec-WebSocket-Accept header value as a pointer/length pair from the HTTP parser. The referenced bytes live inside the application-supplied receive buffer and are not NUL terminated. When the received value did not match the expected accept key, the pointer was passed directly to a %s conversion in a NET_DBG() call, so the logging code measured the string with strlen() and read on past the end of the header value looking for a terminator. The value is supplied by the peer during the WebSocket handshake, before any application-level authentication, so a malicious or man-in-the-middle server reached over a ws:// (or otherwise attacker-terminated) connection can trigger the mismatch branch at will simply by answering with a wrong accept key. By sizing the response so the header value ends at the tail of the buffer passed to websocket_connect() as wreq->tmp_buf, the peer can make the scan run off the end of that buffer and into adjacent memory. The defective log statement is compiled in only when websocket debug logging is enabled (CONFIG_NET_WEBSOCKET_LOG_LEVEL_DBG=y, or CONFIG_LOG_DEFAULT_LEVEL=4); it is absent from a default build, which bounds exposure to diagnostic configurations. The consequence is an out-of-bounds read whose contents are emitted to the log stream: memory adjacent to the receive buffer is disclosed wherever the device's logs are collected or displayed. On targets where the memory following the buffer is not mapped, the scan can instead fault and terminate the connection or thread. No out-of-bounds write occurs, so there is no integrity impact. The fix copies at most sizeof(got) - 1 bytes of the parser-provided slice into a bounded stack buffer, NUL terminates the copy, and logs that instead, so the formatter never reads beyond the bytes the parser actually offered.

Updated Nov 16Remediation
LowCVE-2026-93670
Vulnerability advisory

The Synopsys DesignWare I3C controller driver (drivers/i3c/i3c_dw.c) tracks free Device Address Table (DAT) slots with get_fr…

The Synopsys DesignWare I3C controller driver (drivers/i3c/i3c_dw.c) tracks free Device Address Table (DAT) slots with get_free_pos(), which signals an exhausted table by returning -1. The helper declared its return type as uint8_t, so the sentinel was truncated to 255, and both consumers (dw_i3c_attach_device() and dw_i3c_i2c_attach_device()) also stored it in a uint8_t before testing if (pos < 0) — a comparison that is never true for an unsigned value. The exhaustion guard was therefore inert in every build. With the guard defeated, an attach attempted on a full DAT proceeds with pos == 255: it writes data->dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data[255].id, more than 200 bytes past the end of the 32-element dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data array and past the end of struct dw_i3c_data; it stores the resulting out-of-bounds address in desc->controller_priv, from which later detach, reattach and IBI operations read the slot index back; and it performs a 32-bit MMIO store 1020 bytes beyond the hardware DAT base, outside the table the controller reports. The attach still returns success, so the upper layer believes the device is bound. The DAT is smaller than the software array (its depth is read from DEVICE_ADDR_TABLE_POINTER, commonly 8 or 16 entries), so exhaustion is reachable. In a dual-role build (CONFIG_I3C_DUAL_ROLE with CONFIG_I3C_USE_IBI) acting as a secondary controller, the attach count is supplied by the bus's active controller: i3c_sec_handoffed() attaches one device per entry of the received DEFTGTS list, so a hostile or malfunctioning controller on the local I3C bus that declares more targets than the local DAT depth triggers the condition once per surplus entry. Exhaustion can also be reached from a devicetree that declares more devices than the table holds, or by repeated i3c attach shell commands. Impact is bounded: the out-of-bounds store is a single byte of fixed value at a fixed displacement, with no attacker-chosen data or offset, so the realistic outcomes are corruption of neighbouring static driver state, writes into reserved controller registers, and inconsistent driver bookkeeping (a crash or a wedged I3C bus) rather than a controllable memory-write primitive. The attack vector is the local chip-to-chip I3C bus; there is no network-reachable path.

Updated Nov 16Remediation
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