What's the vulnerability?
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: skip extent mft records in writeback to prevent deadlock This patch fixes the ABBA deadlock between extent_lock and extent mrec_lock triggered by xfstests generic/113, that occurs since the commit 6994acf33bae ("ntfs: use base mft_no when looking up base inode for extent record"). Path A (inode writeback): VFS writeback -> ntfs_write_inode() -> __ntfs_write_inode() -> mutex_lock(&ni->extent_lock) -> mutex_lock(&tni->mrec_lock) Path B (MFT folio writeback): VFS writeback of $MFT dirty folios -> ntfs_mft_writepages() -> ntfs_write_mft_block() -> ntfs_may_write_mft_record() -> holds one extent mrec_lock from a previous iteration -> tries to acquire another base inode extent_lock By removing all extent_lock and extent mrec_lock acquisition from the MFT folio writeback path, the ABBA lock ordering is eliminated: Path A: __ntfs_write_inode(): extent_lock -> mrec_lock Path B (removed): ntfs_write_mft_block(): mrec_lock -> extent_lock Path B is always redundant for extent records because: 1. mark_mft_record_dirty(ext_ni) does NOT dirty the MFT folio. It only sets NInoDirty(ext_ni) and marks the base VFS inode dirty via __mark_inode_dirty(I_DIRTY_DATASYNC), which triggers Path A. Therefore, normal extent modifications never create a situation where the MFT folio is dirty and Path B is not scheduled. 2. The MFT folio only gets dirtied via ntfs_mft_mark_dirty() inside ntfs_mft_record_alloc(). But all identified callers in attrib.c (ntfs_attr_add, ntfs_attr_record_move_away, ntfs_attr_make_non_resident, ntfs_attr_record_resize) follow through with mark_mft_record_dirty(), which triggers Path A to write the complete record. 3. ntfs_evict_big_inode() calls ntfs_commit_inode() before freeing extent inodes, ensuring all dirty extents are flushed via Path A before the base inode leaves the icache.
Business impact & how R4IM helps
This advisory is on our active-exploitation watchlist. Attackers are using it for initial access, privilege escalation or lateral movement in real-world intrusions. R4IM's offensive security and SOC teams already have detections, exploit replicas and remediation playbooks for this issue.
Targeted vulnerability assessment to confirm which of your assets are actually exploitable — not just theoretically affected.
Our pentesters chain this CVE into realistic attack paths so you see business impact, not just a scan finding.
If the affected product is internet-facing, our AppSec team will harden it against this and related OWASP-class issues.
Continuous monitoring with custom detections for this CVE deployed across your endpoints, identity and cloud.
Recommended remediation
- Inventory all assets running the affected vendor and product, including shadow IT and third-party hosted instances.
- Apply the vendor patch or mitigation referenced in the advisories below. Where no patch exists, isolate the asset or restrict network exposure.
- Hunt for indicators of prior compromise — exploitation of this class of bug often predates public disclosure.
- Deploy detections for the exploit primitives (network signature, EDR rule, WAF rule) and re-test after remediation.
Need help executing these steps? Our team typically completes validation and remediation within a single patch cycle. Request remediation support →
Vendor & research references
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76bc14c7097ff678b2b5dbfd4fa33b46897d87ce · 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ffa8f3d30236e0ab897c30bdb01224ff1fe1c89 · 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f831ab09d521898bf1dd99bf5adfd630ea1428e3 · 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
