What's the vulnerability?
Reverse::Proxy versions before 0.04 for Perl allow HTTP request smuggling via a percent-decoded PATH_INFO written unencoded to the upstream request line. PSGI hands PATH_INFO to an application percent-decoded, so a %XX sequence in the client URL has become a raw byte by the time the proxy sees it. The proxy appends that byte string to the upstream base URL, and for an Upgrade tunnel writes it into a request line it serializes itself, re-encoding nothing in either path. The HTTP client that sends the resulting URL does not validate the target either. A path containing %0d%0a therefore arrives at the upstream as a CRLF that ends the request line, and a decoded space, '?' or '#' truncates it the same way. Everything the client writes after the CRLF is read by the upstream as a second request. On the buffered path it arrives on a keep-alive connection the proxy pools and reuses for other clients. Its method, path and headers are all chosen by the client, and the upstream attributes it to the proxy, so it reaches upstream paths that the proxy's own routing does not expose.
Business impact & how R4IM helps
This advisory is on our active-exploitation watchlist. Attackers are using it for initial access, privilege escalation or lateral movement in real-world intrusions. R4IM's offensive security and SOC teams already have detections, exploit replicas and remediation playbooks for this issue.
Targeted vulnerability assessment to confirm which of your assets are actually exploitable — not just theoretically affected.
Our pentesters chain this CVE into realistic attack paths so you see business impact, not just a scan finding.
If the affected product is internet-facing, our AppSec team will harden it against this and related OWASP-class issues.
Continuous monitoring with custom detections for this CVE deployed across your endpoints, identity and cloud.
Recommended remediation
- Inventory all assets running the affected vendor and product, including shadow IT and third-party hosted instances.
- Apply the vendor patch or mitigation referenced in the advisories below. Where no patch exists, isolate the asset or restrict network exposure.
- Hunt for indicators of prior compromise — exploitation of this class of bug often predates public disclosure.
- Deploy detections for the exploit primitives (network signature, EDR rule, WAF rule) and re-test after remediation.
Need help executing these steps? Our team typically completes validation and remediation within a single patch cycle. Request remediation support →
Vendor & research references
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Reverse-Proxy-0.03/source/Proxy.xs#L386-399 · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Reverse-Proxy-0.03/source/Proxy.xs#L654-666 · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Reverse-Proxy-0.04/changes · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
- https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Reverse-Proxy-0.04/source/Proxy.xs#L400-426 · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/23/2 · af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
