What's the vulnerability?
URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') vulnerability in ash-project ash_typescript allows an attacker who controls a path-parameter value to redirect a generated client's request, and the credentials attached to it, to an unintended route or an external origin. The URL builders in lib/ash_typescript/typed_controller/codegen/route_renderer.ex replace each :param placeholder with a bare template interpolation and never call encodeURIComponent, so the value reaches executeTypedControllerRequest raw. A value containing ../ is normalised away by the fetch URL resolver and reaches a different route, while ? or # truncates the path and can smuggle or override query parameters. For a route whose path begins with a parameter, a value such as /evil.example.com/x yields the protocol-relative URL //evil.example.com/x, sending the request and the credentials from TypedControllerConfig to an attacker-controlled host. Nothing constrains the value at runtime: get_path_param_type/2 emits only a TypeScript type, which is erased. The query-string path is unaffected, since URLSearchParams.set encodes its own values. This issue affects ash_typescript: from 0.15.0 before 0.18.0.
Business impact & how R4IM helps
This advisory is on our active-exploitation watchlist. Attackers are using it for initial access, privilege escalation or lateral movement in real-world intrusions. R4IM's offensive security and SOC teams already have detections, exploit replicas and remediation playbooks for this issue.
Targeted vulnerability assessment to confirm which of your assets are actually exploitable — not just theoretically affected.
Our pentesters chain this CVE into realistic attack paths so you see business impact, not just a scan finding.
If the affected product is internet-facing, our AppSec team will harden it against this and related OWASP-class issues.
Continuous monitoring with custom detections for this CVE deployed across your endpoints, identity and cloud.
Recommended remediation
- Inventory all assets running the affected vendor and product, including shadow IT and third-party hosted instances.
- Apply the vendor patch or mitigation referenced in the advisories below. Where no patch exists, isolate the asset or restrict network exposure.
- Hunt for indicators of prior compromise — exploitation of this class of bug often predates public disclosure.
- Deploy detections for the exploit primitives (network signature, EDR rule, WAF rule) and re-test after remediation.
Need help executing these steps? Our team typically completes validation and remediation within a single patch cycle. Request remediation support →
Vendor & research references
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82731.html · 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
- https://github.com/ash-project/ash_typescript/commit/5165f752f5f92b755d946f2d1ce750ff69083ffc · 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
- https://github.com/ash-project/ash_typescript/security/advisories/GHSA-6g23-p936-fm2f · 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82731 · 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
