What's the vulnerability?
Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step. server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge. An attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.
Business impact & how R4IM helps
This advisory is on our active-exploitation watchlist. Attackers are using it for initial access, privilege escalation or lateral movement in real-world intrusions. R4IM's offensive security and SOC teams already have detections, exploit replicas and remediation playbooks for this issue.
Targeted vulnerability assessment to confirm which of your assets are actually exploitable — not just theoretically affected.
Our pentesters chain this CVE into realistic attack paths so you see business impact, not just a scan finding.
If the affected product is internet-facing, our AppSec team will harden it against this and related OWASP-class issues.
Continuous monitoring with custom detections for this CVE deployed across your endpoints, identity and cloud.
Recommended remediation
- Inventory all assets running the affected vendor and product, including shadow IT and third-party hosted instances.
- Apply the vendor patch or mitigation referenced in the advisories below. Where no patch exists, isolate the asset or restrict network exposure.
- Hunt for indicators of prior compromise — exploitation of this class of bug often predates public disclosure.
- Deploy detections for the exploit primitives (network signature, EDR rule, WAF rule) and re-test after remediation.
Need help executing these steps? Our team typically completes validation and remediation within a single patch cycle. Request remediation support →
Vendor & research references
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2831#section-2.1.2 · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
- https://github.com/perl-authen-sasl/perl-authen-sasl/commit/94337367030612842924f697cead29964a96448d.patch · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
- https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L203-222 · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
- https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L410-414 · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
- https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2100/changes · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40918 · 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e
